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Consumption and Social Identity: Evidence from India
* 
 
We examine spending on consumption items which have signaling value in social 
interactions across groups with distinctive social identities in India, where social identities are 
defined by caste and religious affiliations. The classification of such items was done by 
eliciting responses to a survey in India. We match the results of our survey with nationally 
representative micro data on household consumption expenditures. We find that 
disadvantaged caste groups such as Other Backward Castes spend nine percent more on 
visible consumption than Brahmin and High Caste groups while social groups such as 
Muslims spend eleven percent less, after controlling for differences in permanent income and 
demographic composition of households. These differences are significant and robust. 
Additionally, we find that these differences can be partly explained as a result of the status 
signaling nature of such consumption items. 
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`Pramod: We were an underdeveloped country. Now we are a developing country. Since the last ten
years, status is coming up: car, TV.
Ila: A car, bungalow, a lot of money. If you have a lot of money, then your status is high. Whether you
have good children, a good wife, credit in the society, [all that] is secondary.
Pramod: Earlier, money was important, but it was spent on gold and land, not on luxury items.
Ila: Now, one should have a washing machine, a refrigerator, motorcycles, a nice house, decorations.'[18]
Progress made towards achieving the Millenium Development Goal of reducing the number of people
living under one and two dollars a day has been largely due to the rise in incomes that has taken place in
India and China. Income growth in India has been consistently high since India's trade liberalization and
opening of the economy. With changing income distributions, there may be a race towards consumption
to signal status that has important and adverse welfare consequences (by causing negative externalities
and leading to inecient equilibrium outcomes as described in Frank[10] or by its role in poverty traps
as described in Moav and Neeman[16]).
There is a long and well established literature within theoretical economics of consumption as a
means of status signaling, rst described by Veblen[19] and formalized in work by Basu[6], Ireland[14]
and Bagwell and Bernheim[2]. A smaller but growing empirical literature tests for status signaling
consumption; recent papers studying the role of status signaling consumption in a developed country
context are Kuhn et al[15] and Ravina[17]. Charles et al[7] study status signaling consumption across
racial and ethnic groups in the US. They nd that African Americans, with lower incomes on average
than whites, spend more on visible consumption and that these patterns of consumption spending can
be completely described by status signaling.
Consumption to signal status is also undertaken by the poor in developing countries. In the Indian
context, Banerjee and Duu[4] show that median households in Udaipur spend ten percent of their
annual budget on festivals and ve percent on tobacco and alcohol. This is despite that eighty six
percent of the population in this area lives below the poverty line. Bloch et al[5] also provide evidence
of status signaling consumption by rural Indian households in Karnataka by examining spending on
2wedding expenditures.
Our work draws inspiration from and uses a similar empirical strategy as that in Charles et al[7] to
identify visible consumption and to identify dierential spending across groups with distinctive social
identities in this consumption. Our study is the rst to examine visible consumption in India across
a wide range of consumption items using nationally representative data. We nd large and signicant
dierentials in visible consumption across groups with distinctive social identities. We also test the
implications of models that describe such visible consumption as a means to signal status, and nd that
these implications are satised. However, we cannot explain all the patterns of consumption spending
we observe across groups with status signaling alone, indicating that preferences and norms in visible
consumption across groups may also be playing an important role.
By their nature, status signaling consumptions depend on what others believe about an individual's
income. The beliefs of individual income in turn depend on the distribution of income of the reference
group to which an individual is perceived to belong to. In the Indian context the relevant reference groups
are those with distinctive identities dened by caste and religion which are visible in a variety of social
interactions. Caste and religious aliations prescribe customs, rules and norms of behavior, including
naming conventions so that such aliations are visible in all non-anonymous social interactions. Caste
and religious aliations also prescribe group specic rituals and traditions such as wearing of turbans
by Sikh men, wearing beards by Muslim men, as well as rules for purity in the caste system which
necessitate that low caste status be apparent so that such aliations are visible in anonymous social
interactions as well. We dene the relevant reference group for the study of status signaling consumption
as others in the district who belong to the same caste and religious group.
The focus of our study is spending on visible consumption items; these are items which are associated
with high income and are easily observable in social interactions as a sign of luxury or a signal of wealth.
The categorization of such items depends on the social context. We categorize such items in the Indian
context by directly carrying out a survey in India. We combine the results of our survey with nationally
representative micro data on household consumption in the 2005 Indian Human Development Survey
(IHDS) to study dierences in conspicuous consumption across groups with distinctive social identities.
We nd that disadvantaged low caste groups also known as Other Backward Castes (OBC), spend
signicantly more on status signaling consumption than Brahmin and High Caste groups with a higher
3social standing in society once we control for permanent income and demographic characteristics of
households. At the same time we nd that Muslims, a social group very similar to the OBC in income
and total expenditure distributions, spend signicantly less on visible consumption items than Brahmin
and High Caste households.
We nd that OBC households spend approximately nine percent more on visible consumption than
High Caste and Brahmin households with similar permanent income and household demographics. Mus-
lim households spend eleven percent less on visible consumption than High Caste and Brahmin house-
holds. Examining specic components of visible consumptions we nd that the higher spending of OBC
households comes from higher spending on personal transport, social functions, jewelry, personal goods
and house rent, while the lower spending of Muslim households comes from their lower spending on
footwear, social functions and clothing. We nd the same patterns of consumption spending when we
restrict the sample to rural households or when we use an alternative measure of visible consumption.
The high expenditures on visible consumption by the OBC are diverted from education expenditures
while Muslim households divert spending from visible consumption and education towards food expen-
ditures. Part of the gap in visible consumption that we observe across groups with distinctive social
identities can be explained as a result of the status signaling nature of this consumption. The OBC
spend more on visible consumption to distinguish themselves from others in their reference group (de-
ned as other OBCs in the same district). However, we cannot explain the lower spending on visible
consumption by Muslim households compared to other social groups by status signaling models alone,
which suggests that dierences in preferences and norms across social groups against such spending (or
in the enforcement of these norms) may also play an important role. The dierences that we observe
may also be arising from dierences in marriage rules and customs between and across social groups
which in turn impact the incentive to visibly consume to attract a better partner.
Our work has policy importance in the debate on how to transform economic growth to include
disadvantaged social groups. Increases in income are not necessarily spent on items such as education
and health; disproportionately consumption spending may be diverted to signal status. Such diversion
may be more important for some groups in society compared to others and may be symptomatic of
dynamic ineciencies in the economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on social groups
4in India. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical framework. Section 5 presents
the result on consumption spending by groups with distinctive social identities in India. Section 6
concludes.
2 Background
A multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, India has a variety of religions and cultures. The dominant
religious group is the Hindu religion (according to the 2001 Census of India approximately 80:5% of the
population is Hindu), but there are also large numbers of Muslims (13:5% of the population), Christians
(2:3% of the population), Sikhs (1:9% of the population) and other religious groups. Some of these
groups are regionally concentrated (for instance Christians in the North East and in the states of Goa
and Kerala, Sikhs in the Northern states of Punjab, New Delhi and Haryana). All of these are groups
with very distinctive social identities, cultures, customs and norms. Another important and historically
disadvantaged group which is outside the Hindu religion and the caste system is the Tribals (now referred
as Adivasis or Scheduled Tribes).
Within the Hindus, there are important distinctions across caste. The caste system is a system of
social stratication in which classes are dened by endogamous hereditary groups, often termed jatis
or castes. The caste system is believed to be as old as 3000 years. The word caste derives from the
Portuguese `casta', meaning breed, race, or kind. Among the Indian terms that are sometimes translated
as caste are varna, jati, jat, biradri, and samaj. All of these terms refer to ranked groups of various sizes
and breadth. Varna, or color, actually refers to large divisions that include various castes; the other
terms include castes and subdivisions of castes sometimes called sub-castes.
The caste system consists of the following broad divisions (or varnas): Brahmins (Priests), Kshatriyas
(Warriors), Vaisyas (Merchant), Sudras (Servants), and Untouchables (outcasts, lowest menial jobs, now
referred as Dalits or Scheduled Castes). In independent India, Other Backward Classes is added as a new
category (OBC). The OBC category consists of castes that are just above the Dalits and largely belong
to the upper sections of Shudra category, with a few lower ranking Kshatriyas jatis being included.
Each of the ve caste groups are distinguished based on their own customs and rules which dene an
5individual's status, behavior, rituals, occupation, food, and marriage among other characteristics.1
There exists some correlation between ritual rank on the caste hierarchy and economic prosperity.
Members of higher-ranking castes tend, on the whole, to be more prosperous than members of lower-
ranking castes. Many low-caste people live in conditions of great poverty and social disadvantage.2 In
independent India, armative action policies have been geared towards the Dalits, Adivasis and OBC.
3 Data
3.1 India Human Development Survey
We use consumption data from the 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS), a nationally
representative household data set collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in
New Delhi and the University of Maryland (Desai, Reeve and NCAER 2009). 3
The advantage of using this survey is that it includes many questions that are not asked in the larger
and more commonly used Indian household survey, the National Sample Survey (NSS). In particular,
detailed questions on income and on social group status are asked in the IHDS, which the NSS does not
include. This survey is the rst, to our knowledge, which includes detailed information on incomes and on
caste and religious groups after the 1931 census. Our analysis exploits the information on social groups
contained in this dataset, together with information on each household's consumption expenditures and
incomes.
There are forty seven consumption categories in the IHDS, which are based on the short form
questions in the NSS. Thirty of the consumption categories, which are frequently purchased items, use a
thirty day time frame while the other seventeen use a three hundred and sixty ve day time frame. We
convert all expenditures to the annual time frame before estimation. The income measure that we use
in our estimations is constructed as the sum total (for each household) of wages and salaries, non-farm
business income, net agricultural income, remittances, property and other income and public benets.
1Brahmins, Kshatriya, and Vaishya are considered higher in status than Shudras because adolescent males from these
varnas undergo a thread ceremony making them `twice born', a privilege not available to Shudras. Brahmins are concep-
tualized as being at the top of the stratication system, superseding the the Kshatriyas in spite of the latter's worldly
power and wealth as the ruling caste.
2see Desai 2008 for detailed discussion on caste in 21st century India.
3The survey covered all the states and union territories of India except Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep, two
union territories which together account for less than 0:05% of India's population.
6Each of these incomes are in turn constructed from more than fty dierent sources of income queried
in the IHDS.
Our estimation sample consists of 36;664 households: these are households in the IHDS where we
have individual level information for household heads and for which household head is between 18 and
65 years of age. Our estimation sample has 2;009 Brahmin households, 6;134 high caste households,
12;408 OBC households, 7;613 Dalit households, 3;207 Adivasi households, 4;231 Muslim households,
563 Sikh and Jain households and 606 Christian households.
There are some dierences in demographic composition of households by social group, as given in
table 1. While the average age of the household head varies between 43 and 47 years, Dalit and Adivasi
household heads are the youngest while Sikh/Jain and Christian household heads are the eldest, on
average. Approximately 88% of households of all social groups have married household heads. Also,
91% of households of all social groups have male household heads, this fraction being the highest for
Sikh/Jain households and lowest for Christian households. There is also some demographic variation in
household size across the dierent social groups; while the average family size is 5:2, Muslim households
have an average which is the highest at 5:8 and Christian households have an average which is the lowest,
at just 4:3. There is less variation in number of adults in the households, the average number of adults
across all social groups is 2:7, with the highest average number of adults for Sikh/Jain households.
The variation in education across the dierent social groups is quite striking: Brahmin households do
particularly well, with higher education for household heads and greater proportion of households with
college graduates than any other group (41% in comparison to the next highest which is 28%); Dalit
and Adivasi households do particularly badly with the lowest education for household heads and lowest
proportion of college graduates. OBC and Muslim households also do relatively badly; the household
heads have less education and there are smaller proportions of college graduates. High caste households
as well as Sikh/Jain and Christian households do relatively better with more education attained by
household heads and higher proportions of college graduates.
Overall household income and consumption across social groups in our sample is in line with estimates
from other sources: we nd household income and consumption to be the highest for Brahmin, High
Caste, Sikh/Jain and Christian households, lower but similar for OBC and Muslim households and lowest
for Dalit and Adivasi households. In our estimation sample we also drop all households which either
7report household income of more than 500,000 Rupees per year (133 households) or total household
expenditure of more than 500,000 Rupees per year (42 households). Figures 1 and 2 give kernel density
plots of income and consumption, for all households and selected social groups (the Brahmin and High
Caste group, OBC and Muslims) in the estimation sample. Again, while Brahmin and High Caste
groups have higher household income and consumption, the OBC and Muslim households have very
similar distributions of household income and consumption.
The mean annual household income for all households in the sample is Rs. 51,200. There is a
large variation in mean income across social groups, with Brahmin households having a mean income
of Rs. 81,700 and Dalit households having a mean income of Rs. 38,900. The highest mean incomes
are those of Brahmin households and of Sikh/Jain households. Next are mean incomes of Christian
and High Caste households. OBC and Muslim households have similar mean incomes and the lowest
mean incomes are those for Dalit and Adivasi households. The mean household expenditures also show
similar variation across the dierent social groups. For OBC, Dalit and Muslim households, the mean
of total expenditure exceeds the mean of total household incomes. Indeed, the dierent households also
have a substantial outstanding debt, with this debt being particularly large (as a proportion of income)
for OBC households. The proportion of households that are below the poverty line is approximately 20
percent for the overall sample and highest at 41 percent for Adivasi households. It is also high for Dalit
and Muslim households at 25 and 26 percent.
Among the dierent consumption categories, a little more more than half of the total expenditures
are spent on food. OBC households (unconditionally) spend approximately the overall average on the
dierent consumption categories, while Muslim households spend less than the overall average on visible
and other consumption and more on food than the overall average.
As a robustness check to our ndings on dierential spending on dierent consumption items, we
also restrict the overall sample to include only households in rural areas; upon making this restriction
we are left with approximately two thirds of the original sample, with 23,280 households.
3.2 Categorizing Consumption
We are interested in items which people are quick to observe and which they associate with high
income, so that such items confer status on those who consume them (`conspicuous consumption'). The
8classication of such items depends on the cultures, customs and norms of the society in which such items
are consumed. Recent studies have classied items on visibility using survey instruments, by directly
asking survey respondents whether the consumption of such items is observed and whether such items
are associated with higher income (Charles et al[7] and Heetz[12]). However, these surveys have been
implemented in the US, where the cultures, customs and norms of the society are very dierent from the
Indian context in which we are interested. To categorize expenditures as conspicuous, we implement a
survey instrument in India which is similar as those which have been carried out in the US; the actual
wording of the questions that we use is the same as used in Charles et al[7].
Our survey instrument was implemented as an anonymous online survey; we solicited participation
from 411 Masters students at the Delhi School of Economics (Department of Economics) of which
163 Masters students took the survey. The respondents were asked basic demographic information (as
summarized in appendix table A.1). They were then asked to rate lists of consumption items on visibility
and association with income.
The wording of the question to identify visibility was: `In this question we are trying to determine
how easy it is to observe the amount that someone spends on each of the following consumption items.
Consider a person who lives in a household and community similar to yours. Imagine that their household
is not dierent from other similar households except that they like to, and do, consistently spend more
than average on the following item. How closely would you have to interact with them in order to
observe the consistently above average spending on each of the following consumption items?' to which
the respondent could choose `1: No Interaction', `2: Occasional Interaction', `3: Friend', `4: Close Friend'
or `5: No matter how much one Interacts'.
The wording of the question to identify association with income was: `In this question we are trying
to determine one's perception about the relationship between income and consumption for each of the
following consumption items. Consider a randomly chosen person in society. Imagine that this person's
lifetime income suddenly increased by 20 percent. For each item below, tell us how you would expect
the person's spending to change' to which the respondent could choose `1: Fall', `2: Stay the same', `3:
Increase by less than 20 percent', `4: Increase by 20 percent' or `5: Increase by more than 20 percent'.
The list of items we used was chosen to approximate the consumption categories in the IHDS.
We categorize an item as visible if more than 20% of the respondents say they can observe consump-
9tion of the item even if they have no interaction or only occasional interaction with the person consuming
the item (responses 1 or 2 to the visibility question). We categorize an item as being associated with
higher income if more than 20% of the respondents say the consumption of the item would increase
the same or more than an increase in income if income were to rise (responses 3 or 4 to the income
question). Conspicuous consumption items are then those items which are both visible and additionally
associated with higher income. All such items are given in table A.2: personal transport equipment,
footwear, vacations, furniture and xtures, social functions, repair and maintenance, house rent and
rent, entertainment, clothing and bedding, jewelry and ornaments, recreation goods and personal goods.
All these goods are also ones that one would intuitively categorize as `conspicuous consumption' and
indeed there is also a great deal of correspondence to our categorization and categorizations which use
similar surveys in the US. We nd particularly high proportions of respondents who categorize personal
transport equipment and footwear as visible while vacations, entertainment and jewelry are categorized
as being associated with high incomes by around half the respondents. Very few respondents associate
consumption on food at home items such as salt and spices with high income or categorize consumption
on insurance premiums as visible.
Since our use of a 20 percent cuto to categorize these expenditures may be considered subjective,
we also construct an alternative measure of conspicuous consumption in which we add the proportions
of respondents who categorize an item as visible and the proportion of respondents who categorize
an item as being associated with high income. We then create weights using this sum for all items
and construct our alternative measure which is the weighted sum of all consumption items, where the
weights indicate the `conspicuousness' of the item. We also carry out all subsequent estimations using
this weighted measure, and we nd our results to be robust to the alternative categorization and measure
of conspicuous consumption (the results using our alternative measure are reported in the Appendix B
and described in section 5 of the paper).
4 Empirical Framework
We categorized consumption items as visible consumption with signaling value in social interactions,
as described in section 3.2. We are ultimately interested in whether dierent social groups (dened by
10caste and religion) spend dierentially on visible consumption; we investigate this by running simple
OLS regressions on the log of spending on visible consumption items in Rupees at the household level.
The possible variables that may have an impact on visible consumption across social groups are
permanent income and household demographics. While the latter is easy to control for using data from
the IHDS, the former is less simple.
We begin by estimating the following baseline OLS regression:
lnV isiblei = +1OBCi+2Daliti+3Adivasii+4Muslimi+5SikhJaini+6Christiani+"i (1)
where i is the household. The  coecients on the social group dummy variables in equation (1) give
us the gap in social group spending on visible consumption relative to Brahmin and Other High Caste
groups. While the coecients in (1) are important, we also want to examine how these gaps change
when we control for dierences in permanent income and household demographics across the dierent
social groups.
We begin by including controls for current income in our baseline specication as given in (1):
lnV isiblei =  + 1OBCi + 2Daliti + 3Adivasii + 4Muslimi + 5SikhJaini + 6Christiani+
'lnIi + "i
(2)
where Ii is a vector of the log of current income, the square of current income, the cube of current income,
an indicator variable for agricultural sector participation (whether the household owned or cultivated
land), an indicator variable for non-agricultural business income (whether the household earned any
income from rst, second or third non-agricultural business), a set of education dummies and a measure
of subjective well being (whether the household's conditions were worse, same or better than they were
ten years ago).
Unfortunately the specication in (2) does not allow us to control directly for dierences in permanent
income across social groups, given the permanent income hypothesis. Since total expenditures can be
11used as a proxy for permanent income instead, we next estimate the following specication:
lnV isiblei =  + 1OBCi + 2Daliti + 3Adivasii + 4Muslimi + 5SikhJaini + 6Christiani+
! lnTotExpi + "i
(3)
where TotExpi is the total expenditure by household i.
The concern with using total expenditure as a proxy for permanent income is that if households make
decisions on dierent consumptions jointly then total expenditure is potentially endogenous with expen-
diture on visible consumption as given in (3). Therefore we estimate a specication which instruments
for total expenditure, as given by:
lnV isiblei =  + 1OBCi + 2Daliti + 3Adivasii + 4Muslimi + 5SikhJaini + 6Christiani+
ln d TotExpi + "i
(4)
where TotExp is instrumented by the vector of income controls, I (as described in previous paragraphs).
In our nal specication, we include demographic controls as well as controls for permanent income
by estimating:
lnV isiblei =  + 1OBCi + 2Daliti + 3Adivasii + 4Muslimi + 5SikhJaini + 6Christiani+
ln d TotExpi + Xi + "i
(5)
where d TotExp is instrumented by I; X includes controls for household assets, gender and age of house-
hold head, household size and a dummy variable for whether the household is located in an urban area.
The  coecients in our nal specication (5) give the gaps in social group spending in visible con-
12sumption relative to Brahmin and Other High Caste groups, once we have controlled for dierences in
demographic characteristics and permanent income across social groups.
5 Consumption Dierentials
5.1 Main Results
Table 2 gives the estimation results of the regressions we specied in the previous section. We nd
from the baseline specication and without permanent income and demographic controls that relative
to Brahmin and High Caste households, the OBC, Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim households all spend
signicantly less on visible consumption than Brahmin and High Castes. Sikh and Jain households
spend signicantly more on visible consumption goods relative to Brahmin and High Caste households
while Christians do not spend signicantly dierently.
In the next specication we add controls for log of current income, the square of current income, the
cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated, a set
of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being. All the gaps in visible spending relative
to Brahmin and High Caste groups are reduced from the baseline specication but not eliminated. We
nd (as in the baseline specication) that the OBC, Dalit, Adivasi and Muslim households all spend
signicantly less on visible consumption than Brahmin and High Caste households. Sikh and Jain
households spend signicantly more on visible consumption goods relative to Brahmin and High Caste
households while Christians do not spend signicantly dierently.
If we directly control for total expenditures in our baseline specication, we also nd that the gap
in spending on visible consumption is reduced for all social groups. For OBC households there is no
longer lower spending on visible consumption items relative to Brahmin and High Caste households, but
this gap is not signicantly dierent from zero. For Sikh/Jain households relative to Brahmin and High
Caste households, the gap in visible spending is now negative and signicant at the 5% level.
If we control for permanent income in our baseline specication we nd that OBC households spend
signicantly more than Brahmin and High Caste households on visible consumption items. Dalit, Muslim
and Sikh/Jain households spend signicantly less on visible consumption items than do Brahmin and
High Caste households, while Adivasi and Christian households do not spend signicantly dierently.
13When we control for demographic variables (gender and age of household head, household size and a
dummy variable for whether the household is located in an urban area) and household assets in addition
to permanent income we nd that OBC households spend signicantly more on visible consumption
items than Brahmin and High Caste households but that Muslim and Sikh/Jain households spend
signicantly less.
Our nding that OBC and Muslim households in particular exhibit such dierences in spending
behavior is interesting given that these groups are similar along many dimensions (for instance, recall the
similarity in household income and consumption distributions for these two groups as given in gures 1
and 2). The dierences in spending on visible consumption between these groups can also be seen in gure
3 which plots the kernel density of the log of visible spending for all households, for Brahmin and High
Caste households, for OBC households and for Muslim households. While the unconditional spending on
visible consumption is highest for Brahmin and High Caste households, note that OBC households have
higher visible consumption spending than Muslim households. The dierence in spending across the two
groups can also be seen in gure 4 which plots the Engel curves for all households, for Brahmin and
High Caste households, for OBC households and for Muslim households. Engel curves are constructed
by estimation of locally weighted regressions of log of visible spending on log of total expenditures, where
the log of total expenditures is instrumented by the vector I (as described in section 4). From gure 4,
OBC households spend more on visible items at all levels of expenditures than Muslim households.
If OBC households spend more on visible consumption items and Muslim households spend less on
visible consumption items, then how does their spending dier on other expenditure categories? We also
examine expenditures on education, health and food items across these social groups by constructing
Engel curves given in gures 5, 6 and 7. We nd that Brahmin and High Caste households spend more
on education at every level of expenditure than OBC households but that Muslim households spend
less than OBC households on education. However, we also nd that Muslim households spend more
than OBC households on health and food expenditures, particularly at higher expenditure levels. This
suggests that OBC households may be spending more on visible consumption by diverting spending
from education while Muslim households spend more on health and food by diverting spending from
education spending as well as visible consumption.
We also carry out two dierent robustness checks. First we restrict our sample to rural areas only, the
14results reported in table B.1. While the coecients on our social group dummies are somewhat smaller
than for the overall sample we nd that the sign and signicance of the coecients is remarkably robust:
we continue to nd that OBC households spend signicantly more and Muslim households signicantly
less on visible consumption than the Brahmin and High Caste groups. Second we use a weighted measure
of visible spending where weights are assigned to all consumption goods and these weights indicate the
`conspicuousness' of the item, the results reported in table B.2 (weights are constructed as described in
section 3.2). We again nd that the sign and signicance of our coecients is robust to our alternative
categorization of visible spending: we continue to nd that OBC households spend signicantly more
and Muslim households signicantly less than the Brahmin and High Caste groups.
In table 3 we also report the social group gaps in visible spending on each of the specic categories
that are used to construct the overall measure of visible spending, after including controls for permanent
income and demographic composition of households. We nd that OBC households spend signicantly
more than Brahmin and High Caste households in expenditures on personal transport, social functions,
jewelry, recreation goods, personal goods and house rent. We also nd Muslim households spend signi-
cantly less on social functions and on clothing. Both OBC and Muslim households spend signicantly less
on footwear than Brahmin and High Caste households, while Sikh/Jain households spend signicantly
more. Dalit and Adivasi households also spend signicantly more on personal transport and personal
goods than do Brahmin and High Caste households. Adivasi households spend signicantly more on
social functions and less on clothing than do Brahmin and High Caste households after controlling for
dierences in permanent income and demographic composition of households.
Our nding regarding social functions (such as wedding celebrations) is interesting and important;
we nd that OBC households spend signicantly more than Brahmin and High Caste households and
that Muslims spend signicantly less than Brahmin and High Caste households on social functions.
Some of our results may also be driven by younger people in the household who wish to signal status in
the marriage market; dierences in marriage rules and customs between and across social groups may
also explain some of our results.
We next turn to the underlying mechanisms behind the gaps that we observe.
155.2 Underlying Mechanisms
We nd that OBC households spend more on visible consumption than Brahmin and High Caste
households after we control for permanent income and demographic composition of the household, and
that this result is robust to restricting our sample to rural households or to using an alternative measure
of visible consumption. We also nd that Muslims, who are otherwise similar to OBC households, spend
less on visible consumption than Brahmin and High Caste households, after controlling for permanent
income and demographic composition of households. Can these consumption spending patterns be
explained as a means of status signaling?
Among the variables available to us, which we construct at the district level, is the mean and
dispersion in incomes of households belonging to groups with distinctive social identities in the district.
Using these constructed variables allows us to test implications of status signaling models such as in
Glazer and Konrad[11].4
Status signaling consumption is derived from the utility that individuals gain from status, which
depends on the beliefs of others regarding their income and wealth. Others cannot observe income
and wealth directly but they can easily observe conspicuous consumption. Spending by households on
conspicuous consumption then depends on the distribution of income of the reference group to which a
household is perceived to belong to. We assume in our empirical analysis that the social group (dened
by caste and religion) in ones own district is the relevant reference group. Thus, an OBC or a Muslim
household's spending on conspicuous consumption will depend on the income distribution of other OBC
or Muslim households in the same district.
We use groups with distinctive identities dened by caste and religious aliations as the relevant
reference group because such aliations are visible in a variety of social interactions in India. Caste
and religious aliations prescribe customs, rules and norms of behavior. Caste and religious aliations
prescribe naming conventions so that such aliations are visible in all non-anonymous social interactions.
Caste and religious aliations also prescribe group specic rituals and traditions such as wearing of
turbans by Sikh men, wearing beards by Muslim men, as well as rules for purity in the caste system
which necessitate that low caste status be apparent so that such aliations are visible in anonymous
4Glazer and Konrad[11] examine status signaling by making charitable contributions, in this context we examine status
signaling by spending on conspicuous consumption items.
16social interactions as well.
There are several implications of status signaling consumption that we can empirically test using our
data. One implication of such models is that if poorer people are added to the reference group then
people spend more to signal status to distinguish themselves from others in this reference group. This
suggests we should observe spending on visible consumption items which are associated with higher
income to be declining in reference group income. As we show, we are able to verify this implication
using our data.
Another implication of status signaling models is that the eect of an increase in the dispersion of
reference group income is theoretically ambiguous. For instance, if income is transferred to a richer
person then the conspicuous consumption of the rich person increases and that of the person from
whom income is taken away falls but the relative magnitudes of the two depend on the curvature of the
relationship between conspicuous consumption and incomes, which may either be concave or convex.
In order to test these implications, we construct the mean and dispersion in income of households
from the same reference group in the district MIsd and DIsd where s is the social identity of the household
and d is the district in which the household resides. We then estimate the following OLS regressions:
lnV isiblei =  + 1OBCi + 2Daliti + 3Adivasii + 4Muslimi + 5SikhJaini + 6Christiani+
ln d TotExpi + Xi +  lnMIsd + DIsd + "i
(6)
We nd the implications of the status signaling models are satised using the IHDS data. The results
are reported in table 4. We nd the coecient on mean income of own reference group to be negative
and signicant, as implied by status signaling models. This is the case when we only include mean
income of own reference group and when we include dispersion in this income as well as mean income
of own reference group.
We also estimate whether another prediction of status signaling models, that visible spending should
be declining in reference group income within each group with a distinctive social identity, by running
a set of regressions reported in table 5. We nd that we satisfy this prediction for each of the groups
except for Sikh/Jains and Christians where there is either a negative insignicant relation between visible
17spending and mean income of reference group or a positive insignicant relation. The likely explanation
for this is that there are few Sikh/Jain and Christian households in our sample and moreover their
geographical dispersion across India is concentrated in just a few regions. When we include dispersion
in income of reference group as well as mean income, the negative and signicant relation between
conspicuous consumption and mean income of reference group persists. The coecient on dispersion
in reference group income is positive and signicant for Brahmin and High Caste as well as OBC but
insignicant for all other social groups.
We nd that controlling for reference group income does not reduce the social group gap in visible
spending for all groups, reducing it for OBC and Adivasi but increasing it for Dalit, Muslim, Sikh/Jain
and Christian households. We take this as evidence that while there is status signaling associated with
spending on visible consumption items, there are also other factors which have a strong impact on
social group spending on visible consumption items which we are unable to control for. This is strongly
suggestive that preferences and norms may play an important role in spending on visible consumption
across groups. For instance, Muslim households spend less on visible consumption items than Brahmin
and High Caste households, once we control for permanent income, demographic composition of the
household and reference group characteristics. This would be consistent with Muslim households having
a norm against conspicuous spending (or dierences across social groups in the enforcement of such
norms).
6 Conclusion
We study consumption spending on items which have signaling value in social interactions across
dierent social groups in India. We nd that there are important dierences in such spending across
groups, in particular we nd that OBC households spend signicantly more and Muslim households spend
signicantly less on visible consumption after we control for dierences in demographic composition and
permanent income. Part of these dierences can be explained as a result of the status signaling nature
of these consumptions; we nd that the implications of status signaling models hold in our data, in
that spending on visible consumption items is declining in the mean income of own reference group
within each social group. However, we continue to nd gaps in visible spending across social groups
18even after we control for reference group characteristics, which indicates the importance of dierences
in preferences in such spending across groups.
There are important implications of our results for policy: we have shown that status signaling
spending may be quite large among groups which are relatively poor and that people are myopic, driven
by norms and signaling. Giving cash transfers/cash benets to these groups might not lead to spending
on education and health but also on visible consumption. So, for this context, vouchers may be preferable
to cash transfers.
In future work and extensions of this paper we intend to investigate more the underlying mechanisms
which result in persistent dierences across groups in spending on visible consumption and the impacts
of such dierences on well-being, wealth and savings.
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Estimated Other Social Group-Brahmin/High Caste Gap in Log Visible Expenditure
Regression Controls Included OBC Dalit Adivasi Muslim Sikh/Jain Christian
(1) No additional controls -0.3867*** -0.7196*** -1.1328*** -0.4965*** 0.3610*** -0.1096
[0.0212] [0.0225] [0.0309] [0.0304] [0.0550] [0.0623]
(2) Controls for Income -0.0600*** -0.2371*** -0.6123*** -0.1241*** 0.1192** -0.0566
[0.0195] [0.0210] [0.0288] [0.0272] [0.0485] [0.0509]
(3) Controls for Total Expenditure 0.0265 -0.0992*** -0.1000*** -0.1703*** -0.0783* -0.0521
[0.0142] [0.0158] [0.0240] [0.0190] [0.0362] [0.0390]
(4) Instrumenting for Total 0.0600*** -0.0488*** -0.0157 -0.1438*** -0.1139*** -0.0474
Expenditure using Income [0.0145] [0.0167] [0.0249] [0.0191] [0.0364] [0.0405]
(5) Specication (4) plus 0.0861*** -0.0193 0.0546* -0.1077*** -0.1144*** -0.0544
demographic and other controls [0.0149] [0.0174] [0.0270] [0.0202] [0.0358] [0.0439]
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Heteroscedasticity corrected robust standard errors reported in brackets.
3 * signicant at 5%, ** signicant at 2:5%, *** signicant at 1%
4 Base Group: Brahmin and Other High Caste combined.
5 Specication (1) includes only social group dummies in a regression on ln(Visible Spending). Specication (2) esti-
mates (1) with the addition of controls for ln(Current Income), the square of current income, the cube of current
income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated, a set of education dummies and a
measure of subjective well-being. Specication (3) estimates (1) with the addition of controls for ln(Total Expendi-
ture). Specication (4) estimates (1) with the addition of instruments for ln(Total Expenditure); instruments include
ln(Current Income), the square of current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agri-
culture land possessed or cultivated, a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being. Specication
(5) estimates (4) with the addition of controls for household assets, gender and age of household head, household size
and a dummy variable for whether the household is located in an urban area.
23TABLE 3
Estimated Other Social Group-Brahmin/High Caste Gap in Log Visible Expenditure, Specic Items
Dependent Variable OBC Dalit Adivasi Muslim Sikh/Jain Christian
(1) ln(Personal Transport) 0.1187*** 0.1260*** 0.4877*** -0.0116 0.0592 0.1265
[0.0422] [0.0442] [0.0593] [0.0485] [0.0861] [0.1446]
(2) ln(Footwear) -0.1622*** -0.0697*** 0.0219 -0.1139*** 0.1448*** -0.2014***
[0.0140] [0.0167] [0.0266] [0.0180] [0.0313] [0.0375]
(3) ln(Vacations) -0.0972 -0.1196* -0.0820 -0.0735 -0.1467 -0.2719
[0.0497] [0.0557] [0.0695] [0.0579] [0.1440] [0.1405]
(4) ln(Furniture) -0.0188 0.0412 0.1343 -0.1284 -0.3530 -0.0141
[0.0607] [0.0778] [0.0797] [0.0766] [0.1972] [0.1393]
(5) ln(Social Functions) 0.0758*** -0.0164 0.1201*** -0.1372*** 0.0574 0.0673
[0.0243] [0.0284] [0.0400] [0.0293] [0.0644] [0.0474]
(6) ln(Repairs) 0.0335 -0.0187 -0.0070 0.1071 0.2301 0.5072***
[0.0607] [0.0653] [0.0988] [0.0671] [0.1417] [0.1512]
(7) ln(Clothing) -0.0012 0.0138 -0.1170*** -0.0854*** 0.0111 -0.0045
[0.0146] [0.0176] [0.0273] [0.0205] [0.0366] [0.0384]
(8) ln(Jewelry) 0.3536*** 0.0947 0.1195 0.1202 -0.2804 0.7395***
[0.0704] [0.0954] [0.1174] [0.0912] [0.1501] [0.1701]
(9) ln(Recreation Goods) 0.1673* 0.0957 0.0631 0.0770 0.2854 0.3886
[0.0836] [0.1187] [0.1296] [0.1263] [0.3298] [0.2772]
(10) ln(Personal Goods) 0.1237*** 0.1032** 0.6000*** 0.0680 0.2546* 0.6875***
[0.0332] [0.0420] [0.0641] [0.0441] [0.1162] [0.1011]
(11) ln(House Rent) 0.1450*** -0.0544 -0.3695 -0.1010 0.0440 0.3142***
[0.0551] [0.0681] [0.3320] [0.0806] [0.1685] [0.1191]
(12) ln(Entertainment) -0.0140 0.0814 0.1154 -0.0830 0.0515 0.0917
[0.0410] [0.0536] [0.0674] [0.0471] [0.1015] [0.0733]
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as
described in the paper.
2 Heteroscedasticity corrected robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
3 * signicant at 5%, ** signicant at 2:5%, *** signicant at 1%
4 Base Group: Brahmin and Other High Caste combined.
5 Every regression uses specication (5) in table 2 for the given dependent variable.
24TABLE 4
Estimated Other Social Group-Brahmin/High Caste


















1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Devel-
opment Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as described in the
paper.
2 Heteroscedasticity corrected robust standard errors are reported
in brackets.
3 * signicant at 5%, ** signicant at 2:5%, *** signicant at 1%
4 Base Group: Brahmin and Other High Caste combined.
5 Specication (I) estimates specication (5) in table 2 with the ad-
dition of mean income of own social group in the district. Speci-
cation (II) estimates specication (5) in table 2 with the addition
of mean income of own social group in the district and also the
dispersion in income of own social group in the district.
25TABLE 5
Estimated variation in Log Visible Expenditure with mean income of reference group, each social group
(I) (II)
Social Group Coecient on Mean Coecient on Mean Coecient on Dispersion in
Income of Reference Group Income of Reference Group Income of Reference Group
Brahmin and High Caste -0.1090*** -0.1266*** 0.1458***
[0.0306] [0.0315] [0.0275]
OBC -0.0925*** -0.1041*** 0.0828***
[0.0273] [0.0269] [0.0293]
Dalit -0.1756*** -0.1836*** -0.0434
[0.0339] [0.0307] [0.0462]
Adivasi -0.2397*** -0.2660*** 0.0332
[0.0473] [0.0499] [0.0485]
Muslim -0.1452*** -0.1559*** 0.0116
[0.0428] [0.0451] [0.0465]
Sikh/Jain -0.0219 -0.0662 0.0834
[0.1053] [0.1609] [0.1173]
Christian 0.1197 0.2092* -0.4326
[0.0774] [0.1031] [0.1073]
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Heteroscedasticity corrected robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
3 * signicant at 5%, ** signicant at 2:5%, *** signicant at 1%
4 In (I), every coecient is based on a separate regression estimated on the sub-sample of the given social group, where
the specication is the same as specication (5) in table 2 with the inclusion of mean income of own social group
in the district. In (II), every coecient is based on a separate regression estimated on the sub-sample of the given
social group, where the specication is the same as specication (5) in table 2 with the inclusion of mean income and
dispersion in income of own social group in the district.
26Figure 1
Distribution of Income, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Distribution estimated by using Epanechnikov Kernel.
27Figure 2
Distribution of Total Expenditures, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Distribution estimated by using Epanechnikov Kernel.
28Figure 3
Distribution of Expenditures on Visible items, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Distribution estimated by using Epanechnikov Kernel.
29Figure 4
Visible Spending Engel Curves, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Expenditures on visible spending are the sum of (annualized) household expenditures on personal transport equip-
ment, footwear, vacations, furniture and xtures, social functions, repair and maintenance, house rent and rent,
entertainment, clothing and bedding, jewelry and ornaments, recreation goods and personal goods.
3 Engel curves are estimated for each social group by estimating locally weighted regression of ln(Visible Spending) on
ln(Total Expenditure). ln(Total Expenditure) is instrumented using the vector I (ln(Current Income), the square of
current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated,
a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being).
30Figure 5
Education Spending Engel Curves, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Expenditures on education are the sum of (annualized) household expenditures on school/private tuition fees (including
private tutor, school/college tuition fees) and on school books and other educational articles (including newspaper,
library charges, stationary and internet charges).
3 Engel curves are estimated for each social group by estimating locally weighted regression of ln(Education Spending)
on ln(Total Expenditure). ln(Total Expenditure) is instrumented using the vector I (ln(Current Income), the square of
current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated,
a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being).
31Figure 6
Health Spending Engel Curves, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Expenditures on Health are the sum of (annualized) household expenditures on medical expenses (out patient services)
and medical in-patient expenses.
3 Engel curves are estimated for each social group by estimating locally weighted regression of ln(Health Spending) on
ln(Total Expenditure). ln(Total Expenditure) is instrumented using the vector I (ln(Current Income), the square of
current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated,
a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being).
32Figure 7
Food Spending Engel Curves, selected social groups
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Expenditures on Food are the sum of (annualized) household expenditures on rice, wheat, kerosene, other cereals,
cereal products, pulse and pulse products, meat chicken and sh, gur and other sweeteners, edible oil and vanaspiti,
eggs, milk, milk products, salt and spices, processed foods and fruits and nuts.
3 Engel curves are estimated for each social group by estimating locally weighted regression of ln(Food Spending) on
ln(Total Expenditure). ln(Total Expenditure) is instrumented using the vector I (ln(Current Income), the square of
current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated,
a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being).
33A Categorizing Consumption
TABLE A.1














Other Backward Caste 5.73
Brahmin 27.66
High Caste (other than Brahmin) 45.86
Other 20.38
1 All items in percentages.
34TABLE A.2
Item Visibility and association with Income for selected items, Delhi School of Economics Survey
(N = 163)
(I) (II) (III)
Item % reporting (I) % reporting (I)
is easily observable has income elasticity
 1
Personal transport equipment 52.83 31.37
Footwear 39.42 23.30
Vacations 33.02 48.08
Furniture and xtures 32.08 25.24
Social Functions 28.85 35.92
Repair and maintenance 27.36 22.12
House rent, rent 25.71 25.96
Entertainment 23.81 50.49
Clothing and bedding 23.81 27.18
Jewelry and ornaments 22.86 53.40
Recreation goods 20.95 45.63
Personal goods 20.95 44.12
Paan, tobacco, intoxicants 35.85 19.23
Services 33.96 18.27
Food at restaurants 19.23 44.23
Salt and Spices 22.64 3.88
Fuel and light 20.75 16.35
Telephone, cable, internet 18.87 27.45
Personal care 16.19 11.54
Insurance premiums 2.91 31.07
1 (II) % of respondents who answered 1 or 2 to question on whether they can observe spending on specic
item.
2 (III) % of respondents answered 4 or 5 to question on how spending changes when income changes on
specic item.
35Details of the Visible Consumption Items:
Personal Transport Equipment- includes bicycle, scooter, car, tyres, etc.
Footwear
Vacations
Furniture and Fixtures- includes bedstead, almirah, suitcase, carpet, paintings, etc.
Social Functions- marriage, funerals, gifts, etc.
Repair and maintenance- of residential buildings, bathroom equipment, etc.
House rent, rent- also for rented household appliances, furniture, etc.
Entertainment- includes cinema, picnic, sports, club fees, video cassettes.
Clothing and bedding
Jewelry and ornaments
Recreation goods- includes TV, radio, Tape recorder, musical instruments
Personal goods- includes clock, watch, PC, telephone, mobile, etc.
36B Robustness Appendix
TABLE B.1
Estimated Other Social Group-High Caste Gap in Log Visible Expenditure, Rural Sample
Regression Controls Included OBC Dalit Adivasi Muslim Sikh/Jain Christian
(1) No additional controls -0.2765*** -0.5836*** -0.9516*** -0.3915*** 0.4426*** -0.0934
[0.0292] [0.0300] [0.0354] [0.0438] [0.0775] [0.0837]
(2) Controls for Income -0.0381 -0.1726*** -0.5697*** -0.1056*** 0.2734*** -0.0518
[0.0266] [0.0284] [0.0328] [0.0388] [0.0701] [0.0709]
(3) Controls for Total Expenditure 0.0222 -0.0967*** -0.0887*** -0.1923*** -0.0776 -0.1015
[0.0191] [0.0204] [0.0264] [0.0276] [0.0525] [0.0560]
(4) Instrumenting for Total 0.0544*** -0.0443* 0.0042 -0.1709*** -0.1336** -0.1024
Expenditure using Income [0.0194] [0.0215] [0.0282] [0.0273] [0.0535] [0.0598]
(5) Specication (4) plus 0.0696*** -0.0247 0.0698* -0.1561*** -0.1489*** -0.1245
demographic and other controls [0.0200] [0.0226] [0.0320] [0.0287] [0.0527] [0.0667]
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as de-
scribed in the paper.
2 Heteroscedasticity corrected robust standard errors reported in brackets.
3 * signicant at 5%, ** signicant at 2:5%, *** signicant at 1%
4 Base Group: Brahmin and Other High Caste combined.
5 Specication (1) includes only social group dummies in a regression on ln(Visible Spending). Specication (2) esti-
mates (1) with the addition of controls for ln(Current Income), the square of current income, the cube of current
income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated, a set of education dummies and a
measure of subjective well-being. Specication (3) estimates (1) with the addition of controls for ln(Total Expendi-
ture). Specication (4) estimates (1) with the addition of instruments for ln(Total Expenditure); instruments include
ln(Current Income), the square of current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agri-
culture land possessed or cultivated, a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being. Specication
(5) estimates (4) with the addition of controls for household assets, gender and age of household head, household size
and a dummy variable for whether the household is located in an urban area.
37TABLE B.2
Estimated Other Social Group-High Caste Gap in Log of weighted Visible Expenditure
Regression Controls Included OBC Dalit Adivasi Muslim Sikh/Jain Christian
(1) No additional controls -0.3980*** -0.6272*** -1.0340*** -0.4150*** 0.3819*** 0.0294
[0.0164] [0.0179] [0.0237] [0.0220] [0.0432] [0.0551]
(2) Controls for Income -0.0989*** -0.1972*** -0.5538*** -0.0867*** 0.1518*** -0.0683
[0.0140] [0.0162] [0.0218] [0.0188] [0.0333] [0.0418]
(3) Controls for Total Expenditure -0.0007 -0.0307*** -0.0406*** -0.1014*** -0.0404*** 0.0846***
[0.0043] [0.0048] [0.0066] [0.0059] [0.0118] [0.0093]
(4) Instrumenting for Total 0.0025 -0.0259*** -0.0325*** -0.0988*** -0.0439*** 0.0851***
Expenditure using Income [0.0044] [0.0049] [0.0070] [0.0060] [0.0118] [0.0095]
(5) Specication (4) plus 0.0302*** -0.0094* 0.0036 -0.0496*** -0.0655*** 0.0499***
demographic and other controls [0.0041] [0.0047] [0.0071] [0.0061] [0.0105] [0.0087]
1 Source: Authors' calculations based on the India Human Development Survey 2004-05, selected sub-sample as described
in the paper.
2 Heteroscedasticity corrected robust standard errors reported in brackets.
3 * signicant at 5%, ** signicant at 2:5%, *** signicant at 1%
4 Base Group: Brahmin and Other High Caste combined.
5 Specication (1) includes only social group dummies in a regression on ln(Weighted Visible Spending) where the
weights are constructed as described in section 3.2 of the paper. Specication (2) estimates (1) with the addition of
controls for ln(Current Income), the square of current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business
income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated, a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being.
Specication (3) estimates (1) with the addition of controls for ln(Total Expenditure). Specication (4) estimates (1)
with the addition of instruments for ln(Total Expenditure); instruments include ln(Current Income), the square of
current income, the cube of current income, non-agricultural business income, agriculture land possessed or cultivated,
a set of education dummies and a measure of subjective well-being. Specication (5) estimates (4) with the addition
of controls for household assets, gender and age of household head, household size and a dummy variable for whether
the household is located in an urban area.
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